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Kartez and Merrill: Climate Adaptation Finance Mechanisms

1. CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE MECHANISMS: NEW
FRONTIERS FOR FAMILIAR TOOLS
In the framing article of this Special Issue, Colgan (2016) has argued, as others
have in recent work (Wagner and Weitzman, 2015; Stern, 2015) that funding
adaptive responses to climate impacts presents special, if not unique, economic
challenges and demands. These include perverse capital valuations in which
negative interest rates imply limitless ceilings on expenditures, problematic
intertemporal cost and benefit transfers across generations, and rampant
uncertainty. Nonetheless, local and state governments collectively face daily
investment and construction decisions about sustaining infrastructure and
managing the built environment that will have a decades-long effect. These
decisions both affect and will be affected by future conditions, but we must address
how to pay for them today. Hence, regardless of whether vexing aspects of climate
adaptation have been recognized, let alone coped with, the decisions about it are
already in play.

2. SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
The purpose of this article is to ground the complexities of adaptation finance for
public infrastructure and risk management in a discussion of the tools and strategies
available to pay for it, largely as it affects the local government level in the U.S.,
where much investment and construction must take place. There are emerging
lessons about how to use such mechanisms and how to approach such decisions.
Existing tools used in new applications and combinations present useful
opportunities.
Although not a theoretical discussion, we address several relevant principles—
mainly the rational nexus test of who benefits and who pays—that strongly
influence public acceptability of such funding schemes. Colgan (2016) uses a
variant of the well-known public goods definition matrix to identify possible
finance mechanisms by who benefits and who pays, following the logic of what is
a public versus private good or service. The discussion and examples herein will
show that those boundaries are not only quite permeable but that successful
development of adaptation finance mechanisms will often require careful
navigation of mixed public and private goods and burdens to achieve needed
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results. Although mixed goods and services are a well-known phenomenon in
economics, hybridizing such goods and services means paying for them is not likely
to be a defect, but rather a virtue, in adaptation. Examples here come from civil
infrastructure, particularly stormwater management. Adaptation takes many forms
and must address both coastal and inland hazards including those from water and
weather, heat, disease and impacts on safety, public health, and all aspects of the
economy. We will focus on water and weather-borne hazards and the adaptation of
the human-settled environment to manage growing impacts. The financing
strategies at local and state scales discussed here can apply across the landscape,
especially when not limiting the sources of funds to limited federal programs, which
is exactly the point here. Some examples of innovative financing are also drawn
from the energy conversion arena (e.g. adding solar electric capacity locally), but
that is not the focus.
The growing and still recent local government experience with stormwater
management funding is an opportunity to learn about aspects of adaptation finance
necessary to effectively utilize money streams that will come from multiple sources
including new bond market utilizations, which will be discussed in part, as well as
local tax and fee revenues. Finally, the focus is on the United States situation in the
necessary context of its institutions and the boundaries of action those entail. Other
nations’ situations must be considered on their own terms.

3. THE U.S. INFRASTRUCTURE CLIMATE FUNDING DILEMMA
It is no revelation that aging infrastructure in the United States already presents a
financing challenge that has yet to elicit a comprehensive framework for response
at any level of government. By many estimates the entire potable water supply
system will need to be replaced over the next few decades—a problem highlighted
for the public by the 2016 lead emergency in the water system of Flint, Michigan.
More systematically the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 2013 Report
Card on America’s Infrastructure gave the nation’s physical plant a grade of D+,
with $3.6 trillion in overall infrastructure needs by 2020 of which $633 billion is
for water and wastewater systems and another $150 billion potentially for new
stormwater demands, (ASCE, 2013).
3.1 The Limits of Federal Financing
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognizes stormwater as the
nation’s most significant water pollution control challenge because of urbanization
and increasing impacts of the changing climate (Milly et al., 2008). Where sea level
rise (SLR) and larger future storms are added factors, coastal communities and
landscapes face even greater impacts, such as the unexpected $65 billion worth of
damage caused by Hurricane Sandy in the New York City region in 2012. Thus
U.S. localities are faced with large needs to maintain, replace and further adapt
fixed water and wastewater treatment facilities and to manage the distributed,
multi-actor stormwater problem for both public and private property, which is
growing. To illustrate the shortfall in meeting this need, Canada is spending 10
times more money per capita on stormwater at mid-decade than the United States.
Thus, a very modest estimate of what the U.S. should be spending at present would
boost the current $8 billion U.S. annual expenditure to $80 billion as a comparable
proportion of GDP.
Limited federal funds fall far short of these needs. A principal federal vehicle
for funding domestic water infrastructure, the State Revolving Funds (SRFs)
created under the Clean Water Act, have provided an important tool for states and
their localities to primarily address wastewater and water supply facility needs.
SRFs provide low-interest loans for investments in water and wastewater
infrastructure and have recently begun to slowly add funds for nonpoint source
pollution control (stormwater). An SRF receives its initial capital from federal
grants and state appropriation contributions then issues bonds guaranteed by this
capital. It then "revolves" via repayment of principal and payment of interest on
outstanding loans. The SRFs lack funds to meet known needs and this “gap” has
recently been addressed by Congress with the passage of Title V of the Water
Resources Reform and Development Act (WRRDA) of 2013, which provides an
additional source of funds for large (i.e. $20 million or greater) facility projects
primarily for water supply and wastewater fixed facility needs but not for
stormwater management. The approach leverages federal funds by providing new
low-interest underwriting of loans for such projects, and can supplement SRF
projects.
This new program is still being deployed and it is unknown if it can bridge the
funding gap for primary water supply and wastewater facilities alone. As of this
writing it was still not in full operation. Managing stormwater is also vulnerable to
climate change and has only slightly been addressed with SRF funds. The US EPA
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has begun vigorously promoting public-private partnerships (known as P3s) to
address water infrastructure needs, primarily in terms of operating agreements and
newer design-build-operate projects involving private firms. In a P3, providers
responsible for public water supply and sanitation systems can be owned, financed,
operated and maintained by either a public entity, a private company, or both, and
can share these responsibilities through public-private partnerships. As the rest of
this article argues, this is not the only mechanism to tap more funds for addressing
adaptation needs that are dispersed and highly influenced by climate change, such
as stormwater.
3.2 Public Private Partnerships as Remedy to Federal Shortfalls
Public-private partnerships, in which the government contracts private entities to
perform different functions, have garnered a great deal of federal attention. Such
contracts have long been part and parcel of construction projects, including that of
the Pentagon in 1942. The Miller Act of 1935 reformed federal use of private
contractors by requiring performance bonds to protect the public. Modern publicprivate can be used to finance, build and operate projects, such as public
transportation, wastewater facilities, parks and convention centers by providing
private capital especially where timely public funds are unavailable (e.g. due to
indebtedness levels). The private entity can also operate a service under such
agreements, which typically have a functional lifetime of 20 to 30 years. The
contractor earns operating revenue by a “concession,” either through payments
from the public entity or direct service charges to the users. A variety of Internal
Revenue Service and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations determine
how these agreements can be configured.
These arrangements have mainly involved physical public facilities. A
celebrated (among specialized circles) and recent innovation has been the 30-year,
$100 million agreement between Prince George’s County, Maryland and the
private firm Corvias Solutions of the Corvias Group, Inc. to fully operate this
rapidly growing, heavily urbanized county’s stormwater management program as
an enterprise (Corvias Group, 2014). Other major urban counties in the Chesapeake
Bay watershed are likely to follow suit (University of Maryland Environmental
Finance Center 2016—hereafter UMD EFC). In such arrangements, the
government entity pays the operator for this service. Like a growing number of
localities, the county has instituted a stormwater utility fee—a money-raising
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mechanism to be discussed below and elsewhere in this article as an example of a
conventional tool (user fees and surcharges) extended to new problems and
situations (dispersed stormwater management rather than a facility usage fee like a
water supply or a park).
The significance of stormwater utilities is that, rather than charging users for a
metered service (such as a water supply, toll road or entrance to a sports facility),
this arrangement involves a broad system that is both a private and public good.
Such fees are based on measures of each property’s contribution to storm runoff,
but also contribute to a systemic level of management of the environment, which,
as it has non-excludable benefits, cannot be considered private goods. This
represents an innovation in that stormwater utilities, as we will argue in the
following sections, represent an expansion of existing public fiscal latitude and
options for funding environmental services.

4. PROPOSED AND DEVELOPING FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS
Whether coastal or inland, the local and state levels are the necessary context to
examine emerging tools to pay for adaptive action to respond to climate impacts.
Though existing tools provide many opportunities for novel deployment to fund
adaptation, there are also needs for institutional innovation at both state and federal
levels to facilitate leveraging and combining funds in new ways—for example
through more such arrangements as that in Prince George’s County. There is also
growing high-level interest in market-based funding mechanisms including trading
schemes and catastrophe, resiliency and green bonds. Nonetheless, in further
discussing those new schemes here and in later sections, it is also important to
recognize how the local project scale remains a critical element in utilizing any
such funds and how existing tools represent innovations when configured for new
purposes.
Stormwater control funding and management schemes as an area of everyday
innovation have become a major applied industry as well as a key local government
function. It is a prosaic arena that perhaps has not received the attention deserved
in adaptation economics. Complex and still sparsely implemented mechanisms—
trading markets and new bond products—do not tell the whole story of how local
governments are pursuing approaches that may integrate public and private
resources in projects and programs. This trend might be further represented here by
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Figure 1, an alternative to the classification of finance mechanisms strictly in terms
of who pays and who benefits, because those boundaries are permeable and
dynamic.

Figure 1. Desirable dynamics in public-private resilience finance

Here the role of public investments and organization is to leverage and facilitate
private participation as well, and innovation that creates multiple co-benefits which
allows for the leveraging. Each of these finance arenas—new bond products,
market trading schemes and lessons from stormwater finance—will be discussed as
well as some of the institutional demands involved.
4.1 Catastrophe and Resilience Bonds
In the face of federal resource limits, both tapping private resources more
effectively and the pursuit of more effective project approaches are growing
directions for local financing strategies. Catastrophe bonds have thus received new
attention as one means to raise private funds for post-disaster recovery in an
innovative manner. The Rockefeller Foundation-funded re:focus Partners group
has proposed a framework for better promoting such catastrophe-bond-like
investments and possibly to tie variable investment returns to risk reduction
resulting from the local use of the bond funds (re:focus Partners, 2015a).
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The catastrophe bond as insurance strategy does not, however, address the need
for proactive investment to transition to resilient infrastructure in the first place.
Resilience bonds, another new bond product receiving attention in specialized
circles, are a potential means to fund such action. Green bonds, a term for the type
of social and economic benefits to be funded, have emerged to be applied largely
to energy efficiency and renewable energy projects with readily identifiable
benefits over time. There are lessons about the use of such bonds for distributed
(i.e., multiple household or business sector) energy conversion projects that are
useful to consider and are discussed later in this section. But resilience bonding for
long-term hazard reduction actions will require more challenging specification and
monetization of benefits of avoided costs or damages. Moreover, pre-emptive
adaptation is still an immediate local responsibility. That is the level where benefits
are created and thus become trans-actable through the inventive design of the
projects to be funded.
The frontier for true resiliency bonds may be “assetizing” risk-reducing
adaptation actions. For example, investors would provide funds for such actions
within a defined area such as a city or county or regional feature like an area of
coastline. The resiliency-bond-as-insurance concept being promoted by the
re:focus Partners LLC REBOUND project is a step towards this as shown on the
following page in their Figure 2 (re:focus Partners LLC, 2015a). As bond funds are
used to make investments that reduce risk, the insured local government entity
would receive a rebate which is a reduction in the bond repayment based on the
presumed better-protected capital investment by the bond buyers (i.e., a lesser
chance of triggering the damage loss level that requires paying out capital to the
insured).
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Figure 2. Resilience bond concept (re:focus Partners, 2015a)

However, this value capture scheme for adaptive risk reduction is currently only
a prototype and would have to be implemented at a scale large enough to create a
market. Localities may need to incrementally improve risk reduction until the
conventional bond market responds with preferential rates for further infrastructure
investment. Nonetheless, for more than 50 years the natural hazards community has
barely achieved necessary progress in risk reduction (See Mileti, 1999).
State infrastructure banks can play a larger role in public adaptation finance.
They are an essential conduit for local project funding and are being extended in
new ways via local project and program design to climate-relevant adaptation and
to private actors. But the institutional configurations vary from state to state and
larger industrial states have more to offer. For example, in Pennsylvania the state’s
2013 General Assembly session innovatively expanded the authority of
PENNVEST—the Pennsylvania Infrastructure Investment Authority—to include
stormwater and nonpoint pollution projects, including private as well as public
borrowers. PENNVEST has also underwritten some of the construction of
Lancaster’s green infrastructure projects discussed in a later section.
The terrain of state infrastructure loan and bond underwriting agencies is
complex: for example, the Pennsylvania Infrastructure Bank (PIB) and
PENNVEST are two different authorities, the former of which deals with funding
for all modes of transportation works (road, rail, air, sea) in the state. Explaining
the institutional landscape nationwide is beyond the scope of this article. State
underwriting authorities will play a major role in any effective solutions to funding
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climate adaptation at the local level and in utilizing private capital markets, but
alignment with those purposes must be developed on a state by state basis.
The energy conversion arena provides a useful example of how the existing
bond market, together with local fiscal revenue tools, can propel innovation in local
adaptation. These efforts contribute to the arena of climate change mitigation
(greenhouse gas reduction), which aims to achieve de-carbonization. Attention
should be paid to the translatable lessons from one use of such fiscal mechanisms
to other arenas, e.g. from the local-scale energy conversion setting to other local
adaptation project situations.
Energy projects for de-carbonization at both large (e.g., power utility) and
smaller (household or business property) scales have financing advantages that
hazard reduction does not. For example, the creation of energy efficiency savings
and actual power generation are goods for which there is indeed a market. City and
statewide adoption of official goals for climate mitigation has led to financing
programs to spur distributed household and business installation of solar electric
panels.
In 2007, the city of Berkeley, CA created a citywide Sustainable Energy
Financing District to enable use of a pilot-scale revenue bond to provide funding to
residential and commercial building owners to install solar electric systems. The
upfront costs of solar conversion can be prohibitive for individual owners but
through this approach the bond funds are repaid through an additional property tax
increment over 20 years, like a mortgage. Palm Springs, CA soon followed suit
with this model that Berkeley named FIRST—Financing Initiative for Renewable
and Solar Technology. Nonetheless, Berkeley’s program faced federal challenges
regarding bond management.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) questioned the acceptability of
the bond provisions and borrower qualifying procedures involved in Berkeley’s
agreement with their bond purchaser, a small venture firm called Renewable
Financing, created by a former Berkeley mayor’s office staff member who was one
of the champions of the concept. Among the issues was the incompatibility of the
lender’s requirements for lien superiority (first call on borrower defaults) with the
expectations of the underwriters of most home mortgage loans—Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae (Lord, 2010). Berkeley’s pioneering program eventually disbursed its
small initial bond fund to local property owners and went fallow for a time. Climate
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Solutions, an organization promoting energy conversion, has argued that this is one
of the prime examples of how “… local government has a critical role to play in
climate leadership galvanizing stakeholders, bringing focus to zones, and
leveraging public financing” as well as creating financial innovation (Tucker 2009).
Berkeley’s experiment has served as a model for state-managed Property
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs in 21 states. These programs continue to
evolve as individual states take action. For example, at this writing the proposed
commercial and residential PACE programs in Connecticut are expected to provide
access to private financing, with, significantly, a senior lien for qualifying
resiliency investments—including hurricane and flood-proofing—that can be
repaid via a benefit assessment on the owner’s property tax (French et al., in press).
The supply of such green bonds worldwide grew by twenty percent between
2014-2015, but an International Energy Agency 2014 analysis estimated that $53
trillion U.S. are needed globally to meet greenhouse gas mitigation targets adopted
by signatory nations. While adaptation funding is a different matter, this gives an
idea of the scale of capital needs for dealing with the future. The director of the
nonprofit Clean Bond Initiative (CBI) noted that while investment banks and other
international investors are raising funds for energy investing, “they just can’t find
places to put their money.” At the same time, CBI has also complained that “the
U.S. corporate market is a big market, so the fact that it’s not playing its part is
worrying for us all” (Douglass 2015). Thus, bonds as a financing solution will
require attractive and viable projects and programs to be conceived to mobilize
capital markets sufficiently, an interactive race that has hardly begun for adaptation.
4.2 Trading Market Schemes
There is also growing interest in market-based strategies such as trading schemes.
While much debate surrounds national-market strategies such as carbon trading,
which could influence large scale energy supply, product design, manufacturing
and other major systems if fully implemented, localized market strategies for
nutrient reduction credits for pollution control have begun to emerge in a few places
with the most extreme needs and capacity to innovate, such as the states and
localities of Chesapeake Bay, at the local government and watershed scales
(Chesapeake Bay Program, 2016). Nutrient trading is a new mechanism and
requires a framework to establish a marketplace for transactions, again with a role
for state government to reach scale. A recent Chesapeake Bay Forum on
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Environmental Finance conducted by the EPA Region 3 Environmental Finance
Center at the University of Maryland reported that:1
While Maryland’s Nutrient Credit Trading Program has not yet seen
much trading activity, its web-based Marketplace and Trading
Registry is a good model of well-conceived market infrastructure.
The portal includes a tool for estimating credits generated by BMPs,
and it serves as a central place for buyers and sellers to make
transactions (UMD EFC 2016:17).
Such pollution trading is driven and defined by pollution control requirements
of the Clean Water Act (e.g. TMDL limits—Total Maximum Daily Loads of
specified pollutants such as nitrogen and phosphorous). This has tended to emerge
so far only where there is a well-defined resource—for example Chesapeake Bay—
in which many actors including local governments and property owners all play a
role in creating impacts.
Trading schemes to engage in adaptive and proactive risk reduction for
infrastructure and communities present greater challenges in terms of defining
benefits and how to distribute those benefits to the receiving traders in relation to
the costs of actions assumed by the sending traders. For example, why should some
property owners choose to buy credits from other property owners who have raised
a road to avoid storm surges? There is not a clearly tradable benefit in and of itself
by which the former can utilize the value in avoided proximate area damages of the
latter’s action. Yet there is a demonstrable need to raise, harden or move many such
roads across coastlines to adapt to sea level rise and storm surge impacts. There is
a community benefit to risk reduction even beyond that which benefits the property
location, but it is dispersed as an externality beyond the transaction. Trading
schemes at all levels remain controversial in that there is an implicit if not explicit

1

The Environmental Finance Centers (EFCs) are a nationwide network of university-based
teams sponsored by USEPA in its 10 regions since the 1990s to address the question of
“how to pay” for environmental improvements. Following the heightened need for
innovation, the EFCs in EPA Region 4 (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) and
Region 3 (University of Maryland) have held recent expert regional forums on emerging
trends in environmental finance, in 2014 and 2016 respectively (UNC EFC 2014; UMD
EFC 2016). Both forums, attended by public and private leaders representing all three
levels of government, utilities, and the finance sector, focus on the need for and conditions
that will foster greater private engagement in environmental resilience projects.
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acceptance of some level of pollution, for example. That has been the basis of
lawsuits by environmental activists protecting the State of Maryland’s nutrient
trading scheme for Chesapeake Bay, although it was unsuccessful (Wheeler, 2013).
The same questions will arise even more so in trading schemes for adaptive risk
reduction: how much risk is acceptable and what are the implications of the variable
distribution of exposure within the trading area?
Credit rather than trading schemes have so far been based on regulatory
mandates which force the externality back into the picture in a manner to be
explained here. There are some systems called “credits” like the Lake Tahoe Lake
Clarity Credit Program (Lahontan Regional Water Quality Control Board, 2011),
in which the term “credit” simply refers to a technical metric of how much each
nonpoint (nutrient and runoff) pollution control measure is likely to contribute to
meeting the required TMDL benchmark. This should not be confused with credits
that have a monetized transfer value in terms of off-setting a fee, as with stormwater
utility credit systems. Many questions remain about how trading schemes can work
to enable distributed (many-site) private investment in adaptive risk reduction. The
experience with stormwater fees and credits provides some potential insights.
4.3 Stormwater Utilities, Credit Systems and Adaptive Action
Credit systems are already playing a substantive role in the stormwater management
arena and being translated into adaptive investments by ratepayers. Stormwater
utility fees have set an important precedent for expanding the legitimacy of public
service charges to a generalized, systemic environmental impact—too much water,
too little of it controlled. It is important to note that the mechanism has often met
with public resistance, being called a “rain tax” as a term of political derision
implying that the government outrageously wants to charge for a natural process.
Yet nothing could better characterize likely funding disputes on the even greater
challenge of climate adaptation.
Stormwater utilities provide an opportunity to go beyond simply raising capital
and operating funds to spurring the engagement of private parties in adaptation
actions in new ways through the offering of credits that offset fees. For a
homeowner, that may mean decoupling from street sewers and capturing runoff in
a lawn area that has been modified to allow water to percolate into the soil or have
slow release after storms. For a commercial or industrial structure, it may mean
modifying parking lots or creating artificial wetlands or green roofs. Such practices
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(often bundled under the terms green infrastructure or low impact development) are
not entirely new but must emerge at a very wide scale from many smaller actions
to create significant resilience. These efforts go beyond the “Minimum Control
Measures” for stormwater required by existing regulation of states and localities
under Phase 2 of the Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES Phase 2) since 1996. But a growing number of communities are
pursuing such systemic efforts because the increases in stormwater runoff in some
regions due to climate change are causing problems with performance of other
Clean Water Act-required pollution control infrastructure (e.g., central wastewater
treatment) as well as more flooding. Multi-actor private investment and innovation
(use of new green infrastructure on properties) that reduces impacts and adapts to
emerging environmental conditions is as much needed for adaptation as are largerscale public infrastructure investments.
The following credit illustration is drawn from the City of Richmond, Virginia’s
stormwater utility (another Chesapeake Bay community) using a residential singlefamily-homeowner’s case. Other details apply to multi-family and commercial
ratepayers but it is not the intent here to review all such details (City of Richmond,
2013). A homeowner could receive a maximum of a fifty percent fee reduction for
installation of a combination of on-site runoff storage, on-site infiltration or other
measures that keep excess water from entering and stressing city storm sewerage
and waste treatment systems or contribute to flooding. Storage control of the entire
housing unit’s roof through rain barrels and creating infiltration for the driveways
with permeable pavement could earn that half-fee reduction level in Richmond.
This system converts part of a transfer payment (the fee) into private investment in
actions that have co-benefits on several levels: property improvement, a
contribution to risk reduction over time, resiliency and a lessening of the expensive
load on public water infrastructure are only some of those mixed benefits.
There are also possible pecuniary benefits to the property owner from such
“green infrastructure” (GI) improvements. For example, the earliest adopters of
such efforts such as Seattle and other Washington State localities and the Toronto
metropolitan region have found that GI investments add value to real property
(Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 2003). With increasing and expensive waterdriven impacts on a variety of local infrastructure from a changing climate—
transportation and critical facilities as well as primary waste treatment plants—
local governments are going beyond minimum regulatory requirements to engage

Published by Digital Commons @ Center for the Blue Economy, 2016

13

Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4

the private sector in adaptation at the basic level of home and business properties
as this will help reduce combined sewer overflows that impact large, expensive
central systems and reduce some levels of flooding.
For example, the Lancaster, PA fee-and-credit system in its first two years
(2013-2015) received 47 private property owner applications for credits for green
infrastructure private investments, of which over 40 were approved for the
exchange. The city has also assisted owners with tapping construction funding from
the state’s infrastructure bank, PENNVEST (Katzenmoyer, 2015). Lancaster’s
adopted strategy intends to cover 25 years of progressive stormwater actions, so
these credits and resulting private improvements are just a beginning.
Stormwater utilities as enabled by each state’s legislation are a matter of local
choice. Thus, the option to develop expanded local funding systems that provide
credit systems for proportional exchange of private investments that increase
resilience is demonstrated by these growing local practices. Whether local
governments and state enablers choose to widen such practices to risk reduction,
for example, has yet to be seen. Some of the factors that will influence this
development are discussed in following sections.

5. PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING THE NEW FINANCE
Figure 1 suggests that we see adaptation finance strategies and tools not as strictly
public goods-private goods categories, but as a dynamic process. The principles in
Figure 1 describe practical design characteristics of financing mechanisms in terms
of three ideas: combing private and public investment where possible; promoting
distributed innovation by private actors through multiple means; and supporting
both aims by designing uses of resources that aim for co-benefits. A fourth
principle—not new to anyone involved in the struggle for more flood and storm
hazard mitigation that long pre-dates concern with climate change—is to pursue
finance mechanisms that move from post-impact disaster recovery funding to
proactive risk reduction and increased resilience.
One of the vital and at times hard-won lessons in winning public approval for
the new stormwater utility fees just discussed has been the need to engage the
public, from the earliest phases of the effort to create the new financing mechanism,
in learning how better management will benefit the community (Office of Policy,
USEPA 2013). Acceptance must also be gained for the specific means of funding.
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To be acceptable, emerging approaches must confront and satisfy the longstanding boundaries placed on American public finance. These are grounded in the
utilitarian foundations of the U.S. economic-legal system and are the basis for
public finance theory and actual everyday practice. Local governments have two
major categories of revenue-raising mechanisms for public purposes. First are
general revenue sources in the form of various taxes, especially those on real
property for local government actions. Nonetheless, in some states local
governments share sales tax revenues directly or indirectly with their states and in
a few states, larger localities may impose income taxes.
Traditional local property tax revenues for public goods and services must
comply with the constitutional requirement for equal protection and the utilitarian
principle of tax benefit equity (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973). This allows for
compulsory taxation to raise a general fund without a specific inventory of
everyone’s consumption of those goods and services. An important modification to
the real property tax mechanism has been the specific enabling by many state
legislatures of tax increment financing (TIF) districts in which revenue from the
new real estate tax base in a defined area can be sequestered for public
improvements that benefit the public but may be used to enable specific
development projects. This is but one example of how the tax benefit equity dictum
has been loosened, how new value is leveraged and how public and private benefits
are mixed.
The second major revenue category includes fees or service charges for public
goods and services, such as water supply and sewer utilities. But many other kinds
of charges have been devised in recent times, limited only by new needs,
inventiveness and success at meeting another type of test: the rational benefit nexus
for incurred burden. This rational nexus test has become even more important as
local governments have faced new needs to pay for the capital and service costs of
growth starting in the 1970s and ‘80s by inventing many kinds of development
impact fees (Nelson and Moody, 2003). Such fees can be successfully accumulated
and used for future public improvements, beyond month-to-month or annual
service, if the rational nexus between the charges and the needs for infrastructure
investment generated by those who are charged (even though they are only part of
the constituent population) is present. This ability to charge for prospective public
goods will be important to the discussion here and represents the context for
development of stormwater utility fees—a later development. We argue that
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stormwater utility fees point to part of the future of climate adaptation financing as
resiliency fees.
Finally, local government borrowing for capital improvements such as
infrastructure and other service facilities that can accrue revenue, such as stadiums
and parks, allows for large expenditures to be paid for over time, given state legal
enabling, a consenting public and a willing bond or loan market. Funds collected
from taxation or fees can be used to amortize payments. Federal funds, such as
those available through the State Revolving Funds (SRFs) and other state
infrastructure finance banks mentioned earlier for water infrastructure, play a role
in contributing to such projects but are limited in dollars and scope. Opportunities
to use limited public funds to leverage additional bond investment from private
markets is of intensifying interest, as already noted.
5.1 Meeting the Rational Nexus Test with New Mechanisms
Although the principle of uniform taxation or tax benefit equity has been stretched
in practice, with both progressive and regressive effects, it has a strong practical
influence on everything done in state and local finance. A test is needed to
determine legitimate public benefit and equitable imposition of costs.
Taking action to adapt to future risks or to address risk reduction that benefits
some areas or groups more than others, and at different times, raises new challenges
to funding. Deyle and Smith (2000) noted that the hazards research community has
long made arguments that private decisions resulting in more risky locations of real
property due to the environment should be taxed more to secure funds for the likely
public costs of disaster response and recovery in the future (Burby et al., 1991).
Deyle and Smith proposed a system of indices for a risk-based property assessment
system for the future public burden generated by hurricane-vulnerable properties
on Florida’s coast, but no such system has been devised.
Benefit from taxes or fees that are imposed to adapt to future hazards of climate
change may appear to violate the tax equity or rational nexus test. The acceptability
of special benefit districts as a staple of local fiscal mechanisms still depends on
this test. As Deyle and Smith (2000):
The efficiency of a separate tax or fee for specific services depends
on the ability to base the tax rate or fee structure on a measure of
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differential consumption by individual beneficiaries. Special benefit
taxes [sic or fees] accomplish this to varying degrees (2000: 425).
The following example from recent research on public preferences for funding
coastal adaptation illustrates that local tax and ratepayers’ perception of benefits is
essential to acceptability of new schemes for adaptation finance.
5.2 Public Preferences Reflect the Rational Nexus Test
In an NSF-sponsored action research project on adaptation in Broward County/Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, community leaders and engaged citizens participated in a
series of workshops in which information on expected damages from sea level rise
and storm surge through 2060 was analyzed for two heavily urbanized coastal parts
of the area (Merrill et. al., In Submission, 2016). The participants in 2014-2015
were engaged in choosing specifications for two alternative adaptation schemes—
phased property buyouts versus elevation of properties for selected areas—and
benefit-cost analyses were conducted for the avoided damages to be realized from
each action versus the investments required.
Participants were asked about relative preferences for different types of local
fiscal mechanisms to pay for such long-term adaptation actions. Table 1 (next page)
shows a revealing pattern of rankings in the choices: general charging of the
community for infrastructure and built environment adaptation—by general
taxation means—is least preferred.
Respondents were unlikely to support paying for a risk that someone else has but
the respondents do not—i.e., coastal versus inland properties. There were two mostfrequently preferred fiscal approaches. One is to use mechanisms like the benefitassessment district, where a line is drawn around those who will benefit from the
expenditures to be made and who will then pay for it. The second is helping to
leverage private investment through underwriting loan access for adaptation. (Note
that this study did not specify the source of the underwriting).
The long-standing benefit district mechanism satisfies the equal taxation issue
because it is based on what the courts have defined as the rational nexus between
benefit and charge. But the jurisdiction-wide fees for stormwater management, for
example, are a small but significant departure from and expansion of the acceptable
definition of that rational nexus for funding responses to broad environmental
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problems—like, potentially, climate change. In the middle with mixed acceptance
in Table 1 are options for long-term amortization of investments in the future—
bonding and loans. (Methods of funding both forms of borrowing—public and
subsidized private—were left open). This result is cause for optimism because, as
mentioned earlier, adaptation will require present spending for actions that should
be amortized in the long-term.
The preferences that align with the rational benefits criterion proved very stable
in this case: for example, as Table 2 (next page) shows, when participant rankings
were grouped by their stated political affiliations, Republicans gave the lowest
average numerical-equivalent scores for every choice, whereas Democrats gave the
highest and Independents fell between the two extremes. However, the first and
second ranked choices were the same across Republicans, Democrats and
Independents, despite some variation among lower rankings. But what will the
adaptation actions and their funding mechanisms we hope the public will accept
look like?
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Table 1. Comparative Acceptability of Funding Mechanisms for Local Adaptation Action
(n=48) (Project Metropole, 2015)
ACCEPTABILITY (% of Responses)
FUNDING METHODs
Create a new county-wide
resiliency fund based on
property taxes
Develop a special district
assessment (on) properties
in areas designated highly
vulnerable
Issue a bond (long-term
borrowing) to finance public
infrastructure improvements
Create a low-interest loan
program for flood proofing
and elevating residences
Add a flood resiliency
surcharge on monthly water
utility bill (ex: specific to
storm
water
drain
improvements)
Raise the local sales tax
slightly (options under the
law <in FL> are either ½ cent
or 1 cent per dollar)

Rank
order

Not
(1)

Some
what
(2)

Moderately
(3)

Highly
(4)

Totally
(5)

Mean
Score1,
S.D.

18.8

12.5

31.3

16.7

20.8

3.08, 1.4

4

10.4

12.5

29.2

18.8

29.2

3.48, 1.3

2

8.3

25.0

20.8

14.6

31.3

3.35, 1.4

3

4.2

10.4

20.8

35.4

29.1

3.75, 1.1

1

31.2

20.8

10.4

16.7

20.8

2.75, 1.6

5

33.3

22.9

18.8

10.4

14.6

2.50, 1.4

6

Table 2. Political Affiliation versus Funding Mechanism Ratings of Acceptability (rank
order) (n=46) (Project Metropole, 2016)
Funding Mechanism/Political Affiliation
Property Tax-Based Fund
Special District Assessment
Long-Term Bonding
Low-Interest Loans for Elevation or Floodproofing
Flood Resilience Surcharge on Water Bills
Raise Local Sales Tax $ .005 to $.01
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Republican
n=6
2.50 (3)
2.17 (4)
3.00 (2)
3.17 (1)

Democrat
n=24
3.33 (4)
3.67 (3)
3.71 (2)
4.08 (1)

Independent
N=16
3.00 (3)
3.56 (1)
3.13 (2)
3.56 (1)

2.17 (4)
2.17 (4)

3.29 (5)
2.79 (6)

2.31 (4)
2.31 (4)

19

Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4

6. DESIGNING LOCAL PROJECTS THAT
REVENUE GENERATION AND BENEFITS

INTEGRATE

Innovation with existing local fiscal tools, leveraging and mixing of public and
private resources and creation of co-benefits are all elements of robust approaches
that are emerging at the local project level with state and other non-governmental
organization support to address the gap that federal funding alone cannot fill.
Among other things, these projects generate multiple benefits that can also create
revenue opportunities to support innovative infrastructure solutions. Projects must
also meet the tests of fiscal rationality for tax and ratepayers and will depend on
creative project design at the local and regional levels. Here are four examples of
emerging approaches.
6.1 Miami Seawall and the re:focus Partners/Rockefeller re:invest Initiative
Miami/Dade County Florida has devised innovative mechanisms to create value
from adaptation by building on local fiscal mechanisms in new ways. The project
is one of nine local demonstration projects supported by the Rockefeller Foundation
with oversight by re:focus Partners LLC in an infrastructure development approach
called the re:invest Initiative (re:focus Partners, 2015b). The re:invest initiative—
an eighteen-month experiment in re-imagining infrastructure projects using a new
predevelopment process with the nine cities—aimed to generate:
[...]projects made possible using a new framework for reimagining
civic infrastructure systems to create both public value and private
investment opportunities, especially for vulnerable communities.
(re:focus Partners, 2015b: 3)
“Predevelopment” demonstrations in Miami and eight other cities resulted from
a competitive recruitment of the participating localities and systematic
implementation of holistic design of resilient infrastructure solutions that
innovatively integrate engineering with finance solutions, short- and longer-term
steps (much like those pioneered by the United Kingdom in its resilience plan for
the River Thames) and a mix of public and private roles and benefits. This is termed
a “new predevelopment approach” to infrastructure replacement and innovation
(re:focus Partners, 2015b). All its details including principles and specific project
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feasibility analyses and alternatives are beyond the scope of this article but are
illustrated using two project examples in Miami, FL and Hoboken, NJ.
The Miami area’s 63-miles of legacy seawall is largely owned by private
individuals. It is unevenly maintained and has gaps in coverage. Some property
owners along the seawall face increasing losses due coastal storms and sea level
rise, in addition to skyrocketing flood insurance costs (re:focus Partners, 2015c).
On the engineering side, the long-term proposal is to build a seaward skirt-wall on
the flawed existing structures, thus protecting and increasing the value of the
considerable and increasingly vulnerable property behind it. On the finance side,
the initiative has explored redesigning the catastrophe bond and/or pooling publicprivate funds, both of which revolve around recouping value by reducing risks and
avoiding losses in well-planned projects. One way to understand the recapture of
value from risk reduction is to view the increased protection of properties as part of
a new type of broad tax increment financing (TIF) district in which the increased
tax base due to redevelopment/development of protected lands could be used to
amortize the hazard mitigation efforts. Theoretically, the re:invest initiative would
expand the scope of both TIF districts and special assessment districts to cover
capital as well as O&M costs for such projects.
This is a summary of the complex ideas in the Miami city report which readers
should study for detail. The value-recapture proposals discussed in this section must
analyze expected costs of no-action versus avoided losses and new value as a
benefit and how that benefit will be accrued to public and private actors.
Although the re:invest framework argues for “large-scale infrastructure”, the
initiative also maintains that localities should pursue portfolios of multiple projects
“at scale”. In other words, they should tailor integrated projects to local benefit and
revenue opportunities of all sizes and pursue these efforts as part of an ongoing
strategy rather than just specific projects (re:focus Partners, 2015b). There are three
more examples that illustrate the potential role of distributed, smart project design.
Two are driven by private foundation seed funding for the project ideas and design,
in Hoboken, NJ and Hampton, VA, and the third is part of a community-wide, longterm strategy in Lancaster, PA.
6.2 Scaling Adaptation to Local Opportunities: Hoboken
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Hoboken is a dense, urban area with an extensive 100-year floodplain, much of
which was under six feet of water during Hurricane Sandy. Coupled with combined
sewer overflow (CSO) problems, even small events pose serious pollution control
and flood hazard problems. The State of New Jersey was awarded substantial funds
as part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s post-Sandy
recovery funding competition “Rebuild by Design”, Hoboken being one of three
target cities. Hoboken also won involvement in the Rockefeller-funded re:invest
innovative design project with re:focus partners LLC (re:focus partners, 2015d).
One of the re:invest projects in predevelopment is a combined facility that
incorporates an excess rainfall vault underneath a parking garage. The garage will
be topped by a four-acre green infrastructure roof that will provide open space as
well as additional permeable water storage facilities. The vault under the six-acre
redevelopment site will drain storm sewer overflow from a large 50-acre drainage
area called a contributory area. This will both reduce flood hazard in a subarea of
downtown and relieve pressure on the sewerage system during large events by
pumping nearly 1.5 million gallons of water back to the hard infrastructure system
when it can be accommodated. The feasibility study for this proposal examines
storage combinations combined with 1, 2, 3 and 4-level commercial parking
garages in comparison to the costs and benefits of either a conventional 4-level
parking-only garage (with the maximum 1,200 parking spaces) or a stormwaterretention-only facility, as well as different 1- to 10-year storm loads and expected
performance.
For Hoboken, a dense, growing city already stressed for parking as well as
hazard vulnerability, both the public and private sectors would accrue the integrated
benefits of the combination of a parking facility and stormwater management. On
the public side, stress would be relieved on the combined sewer system (also
lessening incidences of regulatory issues with state and federal agencies), new
urban outdoor recreation space would be created and a key area of downtown would
increase in resilience with economic as well as safety value. On the private side,
the project improves the attractiveness of a significant downtown area for new
investment and consumption. On the financing side, possible models for this project
include city ownership and operation with parking revenues supporting the facility
or a public-private partnership for construction and operation under a long-term
agreement, also based on parking revenues.
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The alignment between such innovative, project-level public-private partnering
designs and existing funding sources will need to be explored and the scope of key
funding sources likely clarified and expanded. The New Jersey communities slated
for the USHUD Rebuild by Design post-Sandy disaster recovery investment have
significant resources available to them, including the New Jersey Environmental
Infrastructure Trust (NJEIT), providing investment loans for water resource needs.
The first of its kind in 1986, the NJEIT represents an institutional resource that can
help finance adaptation, but not necessarily in projects like those mentioned above.
The NJEIT Finance Program underwrites the NJ Clean Water State Revolving Fund
and other financing streams aimed at local government and regional authority (e.g.
ports, public utilities) water resource project needs including water supply,
wastewater and conventional hard storm sewerage systems. Loans reduce
borrowing costs to those public entities by twenty-five percent (over 20 years) to
up to fifty percent over 40 years, as well as providing support for IRS and SEC
procedures that reduces local consultant and legal costs (Zimmer, n.d.). The
re:focus report on Hoboken mentions this and a variety of other possible funding
sources, but not a definitive funding plan as of this writing.
As argued here, successful use of innovative lending mechanisms will depend
on smart project design integrating engineering solutions with finance and benefits
at a local level. Two further examples from outside the Rockefeller programs
demonstrate this.
6.3 Creating Co-Benefits through Local Opportunities: Lancaster, PA
The City of Lancaster is in the Chesapeake Bay watershed via the Conestoga River.
With forty-five percent of its area in combined sewers subject to overflow and
illegal discharge, and forty-eight percent impervious surfaces, the city has been
involved since 1998 in trying to meet Clean Water Act and other Bay requirements
(such as a sixty percent reduction in TMDLs by 2017) under a 1998 compliance
plan. However, the continued high cost and limitations of controlling the
stormwater pollution and flooding problems with gray (hard) infrastructure alone
and the option of undertaking new integrated water resource planning with EPA
and state regulators led the city to change direction. In 2010, Lancaster adopted a
Green Infrastructure Plan with regulatory approval that aims to achieve what would
cost $300 million in gray infrastructure construction and few other benefits with,
instead, an integrated approach to their urban infrastructure that captures significant
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stormwater volumes while providing many additional benefits. The plan identifies
$140 million in green infrastructure opportunities for all capital projects including
city streets, parking lots, public parks and green roofs that will match the
performance of the previously planned $300 million in hard drainage.
While not an innovative fiscal mechanism, this integrated approach is a national
model for a citywide strategy that maximizes economic co-benefits not project-byproject, but on a long-term and jurisdiction-wide scale—a major change.
An example from the dozens of projects completed to date is the reconstruction
of the intersection at Plum and Walnut streets. This location, a gateway to
downtown with a major building on the Historic Register recently converted to a
signature business—the Lancaster Brewing Company—was also an area of high
storm runoff into the city sewer system contributing to overflows in violation of
requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Chesapeake Bay compliance
agreements. The intersection also had the highest accident rate in the city where
one-way and two-way streets meet. Lancaster is integrating a Complete Streets
approach to their urban transportation improvements with green infrastructure for
water hazard management. The result has been a fall in accidents, a multi-modal
area of the city complementing the redevelopment tasking place and the capture of
2 million gallons per year of runoff. The five funding sources used are essentially
conventional public mechanisms but combined in new ways including
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation funds that would traditionally focus
mainly on a conventional road improvement design (from the Pennsylvania
Infrastructure Bank) and the integrated drainage system funded by a green
infrastructure grant program from PENNVEST.
The Plum & Walnut project won multiple state and NGO awards in 2014. A
2014 EPA analysis recognizes the citywide effort as a model for future integrated
approaches. It estimates that if fully implemented the strategy will save $660,000
in reduced wastewater management costs, avoid $120 million in avoided gray
infrastructure construction and produce an estimated $4 million in annual energy,
air quality and climate-related benefits, for about $120 million in green
infrastructure over time (Katzenmoyer, 2015). The city has also relied on the
assistance of PENNVEST, that state’s version of the infrastructure banks in many
cases being built on but extending beyond the long-time SRF program under the
Clean Water Act. PENNVEST provided the green infrastructure funding, and is
also noteworthy for extending credit to nontraditional borrowers and for managing
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Pennsylvania’s nascent nutrient trading market—necessary finance organization
infrastructure to realize private involvement, as discussed at the 2016
Environmental Finance Forum cited earlier.
6.4 Generating Private Revenue for Adaptation: Hampton Gardens, VA
Finally, The Hampton Gardens initiative further demonstrates that the
opportunistic, context-sensitive design approach to projects is at the heart of
integrating adaptive solutions and creative financing on modest as well as larger
scales. The Stormwater Alternatives through Green Enhancement (SAGE) program
in the tidewater city of Hampton was created to offset the high cost of stormwater
infrastructure projects using an innovative public/private partnership model. (The
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, 2013)
The city, in partnership with the University of Maryland EFC and two
consulting firms, under a grant from the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation
(NFWF), has taken up the practice among some Virginia cities of maintaining
public beautification gardens along key roadways and added stormwater
management. Such gardens lack the subsurface water drainage (such as cobble
vaults and gradual-release mechanisms) that would allow them to capture excess
rainfall in volumes significant enough to reduce nutrient pollution as well as
localized flooding. Creating such systems is straightforward but requires capital
investment.
A program in Lynchburg, VA has been successful in creating gardens for
beautification only with business support for philanthropic and business advertising
reasons. In Hampton, the model designed is aimed at combining a new city
stormwater fee which businesses will be paying with a new stormwater banking
market that will allow contributions to be made to offset costs of new development
by reducing fees. Selling advertising through sponsorship is also an option in the
approach. While facing many challenges in early stages, the National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) is funding this pilot to extend it throughout
Chesapeake Bay (NFWF, 2016).

7. CONCLUSIONS, RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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While the focus of examples here has been on adaptation mainly regarding the
problem of more uncertainty about water as hazard (i.e., stormwater—a major
aspect of climate change for some regions) and due to sea level rise, the general
issues and principles discussed all apply to other arenas for adaptation and
resiliency such as energy, urban heat extremes and public health, to name a few.
Many propositions are emerging from operational lessons about how to approach
adaptation finance challenges that point to the need to bridge the distinction
between public and private goods and fiscal mechanisms in creative ways and at
multiple levels:
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Some existing local and state fiscal tools can be extended and
combined in new ways to support adaptation and they can widen
in purposes but still meet the necessary test of a rational nexus
between burdens and benefits. The use of stormwater utilities is
a case in point examined here. Existing mechanisms for drawing
local benefit districts and perhaps tax increment financing
districts may be others.
Public funds, insufficient to meet needs, can be more actively
used to leverage private participation through packaging of
finance strategies and especially through using underwriting of
preferential private borrowing for resilience to increase
distributed adaptation by households and firms that
complements larger-scale public projects.
Packaging and leveraging require creative and opportunistic
project design and thinking of both the solutions and the
resource or revenue generation options from the earliest stages,
especially regarding the co-benefits that can be created, contrary
to much traditional public works and public finance practice.
This emphasis on pre-development invention and choices is
receiving growing attention.
The local government level is where much invention and
innovation will take place with flexible collaboration of state
and federal levels, and such flexibility is essential to attracting
private financial and organizational participation
State governments have a key role to play in enabling and
facilitating local as well as state level actions in financial
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markets as well as in promoting coordination and providing
technical support for local government level effort.
More research is needed on emerging models such as those briefly covered
herein. The work by re:focus Partners LLC under Rockefeller sponsorship is
important for bringing to the fore innovations that their group is helping invent, but
discussion and dissemination of these initiatives is still very limited. The
characteristics of smart project design at the pre-development stage, as briefly
illustrated here, need more investigation as to their economic benefits and fiscal
sustainability. Most of the emerging ideas and lessons are largely only documented
and disseminated in gray literature, foundation-generated reports among
specialized audiences and in some industry circles. More investigation is needed on
how inventive strategies can be combined with existing state authorities and local
practices, as well as with the financial industry and federal regulators, as the
experience with energy finance innovation has illustrated. Best practices across
states need to be analyzed, as well as needed legal and organizational changes at
federal and state levels. For example, in 2016 the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
decision to expand safe harbors for funds in public-private utility partnerships has
addressed a long-standing issue known by the financial industry, states and some
local specialists. Wading through the understanding of what is needed within state
as well as federal institutions is difficult given the lack of consolidated, comparative
analysis. Adaptation finance forums that bring public and private sectors together,
like those held by the Environmental Finance Centers in the last few years, are
needed within regions and states to bring together the multiple actors as a source of
comparative and detailed knowledge and to identify practical questions that need
to be answered.
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